Thursday, September 26, 2013

Made this street sticker...

and I intend it for re-use and repurposing by anyone, under the Creative Common Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 unported license. Original file here.

Saturday, July 13, 2013

Chomsky on Postmodernism

Relatedly, here's Martha Nussbaum's mordant clearing of Judith Butler's extruded mess. It's great. An excerpt:
It is difficult to come to grips with Butler's ideas, because it is difficult to figure out what they are. Butler is a very smart person. In public discussions, she proves that she can speak clearly and has a quick grasp of what is said to her. Her written style, however, is ponderous and obscure. It is dense with allusions to other theorists, drawn from a wide range of different theoretical traditions. In addition to Foucault, and to a more recent focus on Freud, Butler's work relies heavily on the thought of Louis Althusser, the French lesbian theorist Monique Wittig, the American anthropologist Gayle Rubin, Jacques Lacan, J.L. Austin, and the American philosopher of language Saul Kripke. These figures do not all agree with one another, to say the least; so an initial problem in reading Butler is that one is bewildered to find her arguments buttressed by appeal to so many contradictory concepts and doctrines, usually without any account of how the apparent contradictions will be resolved. 
A further problem lies in Butler's casual mode of allusion. The ideas of these thinkers are never described in enough detail to include the uninitiated (if you are not familiar with the Althusserian concept of "interpellation," you are lost for chapters) or to explain to the initiated how, precisely, the difficult ideas are being understood. Of course, much academic writing is allusive in some way: it presupposes prior knowledge of certain doctrines and positions. But in both the continental and the Anglo-American philosophical traditions, academic writers for a specialist audience standardly acknowledge that the figures they mention are complicated, and the object of many different interpretations. They therefore typically assume the responsibility of advancing a definite interpretation among the contested ones, and of showing by argument why they have interpreted the figure as they have, and why their own interpretation is better than others. 
We find none of this in Butler. Divergent interpretations are simply not considered--even where, as in the cases of Foucault and Freud, she is advancing highly contestable interpretations that would not be accepted by many scholars. Thus one is led to the conclusion that the allusiveness of the writing cannot be explained in the usual way, by positing an audience of specialists eager to debate the details of an esoteric academic position. The writing is simply too thin to satisfy any such audience. It is also obvious that Butler's work is not directed at a non-academic audience eager to grapple with actual injustices. Such an audience would simply be baffled by the thick soup of Butler's prose, by its air of in-group knowingness, by its extremely high ratio of names to explanations. 
To whom, then, is Butler speaking? It would seem that she is addressing a group of young feminist theorists in the academy who are neither students of philosophy, caring about what Althusser and Freud and Kripke really said, nor outsiders, needing to be informed about the nature of their projects and persuaded of their worth. This implied audience is imagined as remarkably docile. Subservient to the oracular voice of Butler's text, and dazzled by its patina of high-concept abstractness, the imagined reader poses few questions, requests no arguments and no clear definitions of terms. 
Still more strangely, the implied reader is expected not to care greatly about Butler's own final view on many matters. For a large proportion of the sentences in any book by Butler--especially sentences near the end of chapters--are questions. Sometimes the answer that the question expects is evident. But often things are much more indeterminate. Among the non-interrogative sentences, many begin with "Consider..." or "One could suggest..."--in such a way that Butler never quite tells the reader whether she approves of the view described. Mystification as well as hierarchy are the tools of her practice, a mystification that eludes criticism because it makes few definite claims. 
Take two representative examples:
What does it mean for the agency of a subject to presuppose its own subordination? Is the act of presupposing the same as the act of reinstating, or is there a discontinuity between the power presupposed and the power reinstated? Consider that in the very act by which the subject reproduces the conditions of its own subordination, the subject exemplifies a temporally based vulnerability that belongs to those conditions, specifically, to the exigencies of their renewal.
Such questions cannot be answered here, but they indicate a direction for thinking that is perhaps prior to the question of conscience, namely, the question that preoccupied Spinoza, Nietzsche, and most recently, Giorgio Agamben: How are we to understand the desire to be as a constitutive desire? Resituating conscience and interpellation within such an account, we might then add to this question another: How is such a desire exploited not only by a law in the singular, but by laws of various kinds such that we yield to subordination in order to maintain some sense of social "being"? 
Why does Butler prefer to write in this teasing, exasperating way? The style is certainly not unprecedented. Some precincts of the continental philosophical tradition, though surely not all of them, have an unfortunate tendency to regard the philosopher as a star who fascinates, and frequently by obscurity, rather than as an arguer among equals. When ideas are stated clearly, after all, they may be detached from their author: one can take them away and pursue them on one's own. When they remain mysterious (indeed, when they are not quite asserted), one remains dependent on the originating authority. The thinker is heeded only for his or her turgid charisma. One hangs in suspense, eager for the next move. When Butler does follow that "direction for thinking," what will she say 
What does it mean, tell us please, for the agency of a subject to presuppose its own subordination? (No clear answer to this question, so far as I can see, is forthcoming.) One is given the impression of a mind so profoundly cogitative that it will not pronounce on anything lightly: so one waits, in awe of its depth, for it finally to do so. 
In this way obscurity creates an aura of importance. It also serves another related purpose. It bullies the reader into granting that, since one cannot figure out what is going on, there must be something significant going on, some complexity of thought, where in reality there are often familiar or even shopworn notions, addressed too simply and too casually to add any new dimension of understanding. When the bullied readers of Butler's books muster the daring to think thus, they will see that the ideas in these books are thin. When Butler's notions are stated clearly and succinctly, one sees that, without a lot more distinctions and arguments, they don't go far, and they are not especially new. Thus obscurity fills the void left by an absence of a real complexity of thought and argument.
Last year Butler won the first prize in the annual Bad Writing Contest sponsored by the journal Philosophy and Literature, for the following sentence: 
The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power. 
Now, Butler might have written: "Marxist accounts, focusing on capital as the central force structuring social relations, depicted the operations of that force as everywhere uniform. By contrast, Althusserian accounts, focusing on power, see the operations of that force as variegated and as shifting over time." Instead, she prefers a verbosity that causes the reader to expend so much effort in deciphering her prose that little energy is left for assessing the truth of the claims.


Thursday, April 25, 2013

Greenwald's Liberal Blindspot

Glenn Greenwald has recently been getting some well deserved grief over his refusal to honestly assess Islam as a source of violence, specifically pertaining to the Boston Marathon attacks. Andrew Sullivan:

"we have a mountain of evidence that Tamerlan was far more extremist
than 99.9 percent of the entire American Muslim population. Why will
Glenn not acknowledge this?"

Why? Perhaps it has something to do with Greenwald's very public libels against Sam Harris and the New Atheists last week. In the face of criticism, he dug himself in fairly deep.

After recommending to his twitter followers an abject and dishonest quotemine distorting Harris' views, he defended himself against backlash by analogizing Islamically inspired violence with violence committed by the other major religions, leaving unsaid of course the obvious qualifier that today, religiously inspired terror afflicts us primarily from a single religion which I needn't even name. Never mind that in the same breath he analogized state motives with religious ones, parrying our alleged "Islamophobic" terror bias with hey, look, the Iraq!

Surely there are a number of terrible reasons to commit violence, but it must be acknowledged that among them religion is a very significant one, and that between the world's great religions, one is today less reformed, less tolerant of blasphemers and apostates, and more resistant, natively, textually, and in its current practice, to liberal interpretation and modernization. Any burgeoning reformation is therefore a heavy lift, albeit one that should be encouraged.

Greenwald has fortified himself inside a windowless citadel of Islamic sensitivity hardly penetrable by even the most blatant assault. He no longer tiptoes around Islamic criticism but has floated off into some far orbit of it.

It seems a school of post-colonial-guilt ridden apologists feel liberally obliged to remain blind to any differences between today's flocks. I submit that as we oppose illiberalism in society we should do so in religion, and that attention should be appropriately directed to those religious traditions which are more illiberal or otherwise liable to inspire violence than others. The Jains may be irrational, but not only am I not scared by them, I am unscared. 

Greenwald and the authors whose views he endorsed allege that this mere observation would place me amongst "Islamophobic" bigots, scientifically rationalizing and masking a crypto-racial hatred. They have shown themselves blind to the obvious point that combatting an ideology - not a race or unchangeable class - cannot by any strained definition constitute racism.

In his response Greenwald has claimed that merely tweeting an article is not necessarily a full or even partial endorsement, which is true. But Greenwald did endorse the libel, both in his tweet and in his response to criticism. Decide for yourself:

Note that the "very revealing quote" is the one that is most dishonestly mined. Here's Harris' email exchange with Greenwald.